Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Metaphysic?

Val Plumwood’s vociferous critique of anthropocentrism, I argue, shares several key aspects of James Ladyman and Don Ross’ excoriation of pseudo-scientific metaphysics. Plumwood’s rejection of mechanism and atomism is tantamount to their rejection of metaphysical assumptions that are no longer supported by contemporary science. Their scientifically motivated—naturalistic—ontology is relational, and I claim that this relational ontology supports Plumwood’s environmental philosophy by giving it a naturalistically motivated metaphysical underpinning. In addition, I argue that a methodological naturalism in environmental philosophy benefits from a turn to systems biology, which also lends itself to a relational ontology. Thus, Ladyman and Ross’ rejection of pseudo-scientific metaphysics, and the relational ontology to which it leads, support Plumwood’s environmental philosophy and her critique of anthropocentrism. I demonstrate that a systems biological conception of the natural world ameliorates several difficulties in Plumwood’s own work, especially with reference to her emphasis on the agency of inanimate natural entities.